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McMahon: Maritime Trade Warfare

MARITIME TR ADE WARFARE
A Strategy for the Twenty-First Century?
Christopher J. McMahon

The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the
U-Boat peril.

M

WINSTON CHURCHILL

aritime trade warfare, also called commerce warfare, is a naval/military
strategy that has been followed since ancient times.1 The idea of maritime
trade warfare is to attack or neutralize the commercial shipping of one’s enemy
in an effort to disrupt the enemy’s economy, make it more difficult for the enemy
to continue waging war by disrupting the enemy’s military supply chain that uses
the sea, or both.
Maritime trade warfare can take different forms. Until the twentieth century,
close blockades of an enemy’s ports were most common, conducted to prevent
the movement of an enemy’s commercial shipping. In the twentieth century,
with the introduction of new technologies such as the torpedo, submarine, and
airplane, distant blockades (farther from the enemy coast) became standard practice. Mining of ports also was practiced.2 In addition, maritime exclusion zones
(MEZs) sometimes were established to prevent shipping from entering a designated area. Maritime trade warfare also has included attacking or seizing enemy
shipping in general, or outright destroying an enemy’s commercial shipping in
particular. In the twentieth century, destruction of an enemy’s port infrastructure
to prevent the loading or off-loading of commercial vessels also became a type of
maritime trade warfare.3
The use of maritime trade warfare in World War II and, to some extent, World
War I is commonly understood. In the latter part of World War I, for example, the
Germans’ indiscriminate sinking of neutral vessels incensed the United States,
eventually driving the country into the war on the side of the Allies.4 German
employment of submarines (U-boats), particularly in World War II, played a
large role in disrupting the flow of supplies from North America and the British

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 15

1

4/21/17 8:35 AM

16

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 70 [2017], No. 3, Art. 3

Empire that was supporting the Allied war effort.5 Similarly, the United States
waged a very successful campaign of maritime trade warfare against the Empire
of Japan in World War II.6
The present question is: Is maritime trade warfare still a viable strategy and
tactic to be employed by warring powers today, or is it an anachronistic practice
that has no place in twenty-first-century maritime conflicts? There seem to be
two very different views on this question. On the one hand, there are military
scholars and experts who not only promote the use of maritime trade warfare
but also emphasize that modern navies should plan and exercise for it, from
both offensive and defensive perspectives. On the other hand, there are military
scholars and experts who argue that commerce warfare is a tactic of the past that
is no longer viable, with no valid bearing on today’s world. Reasons for the latter
viewpoint, among others that will be discussed below, include the interconnec
tedness of the global economy and the nature of modern commercial shipping.
The purpose of this article is to consider both viewpoints and analyze their
theories and supporting arguments. In the final analysis, the answer to the question whether maritime trade warfare belongs in the twenty-first century is complex. There are many obstacles to employing maritime trade warfare in a manner
that would strangle an enemy’s economy effectively or prevent the movement of
military supplies. However, history shows that, given just the right circumstances
and time, maritime trade warfare can work. In any case, it is in the interest of
military strategists and planners to plan for and exercise offensive and defensive
maritime trade warfare in many potential conflict scenarios.
HISTORY OF MARITIME TRADE WARFARE
Maritime trade warfare is certainly not a new military strategy. It has been employed for thousands of years in various forms.
Early to Modern History
Maritime trade warfare was employed commonly throughout ancient Greek
history. In his writings on the Greek Peloponnesian War, the ancient historian
Thucydides (ca. 460 BCE–400 BCE) described nearly thirty years of war between
Athens and Sparta. In these writings he referred to what was essentially maritime
trade warfare.7
For much of history, commerce warfare largely was performed by privateers,
who received letters of marque from their governments. This instrument provided state authorization for their actions in seizing enemy shipping. In truth,
however, there was often a fine line between privateers and pirates, since they
operated in very similar manners. In theory, a privateer acted at least partly in the
interest of his nation, whereas a pirate acted solely in his own interest.8
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Essentially, privateers operating under letters of marque were nonmilitary
persons given permission by their sovereigns or other governments to raid enemy
shipping. This activity often was referred to as guerre de course. The intention was
to enable a weaker naval power to attack a stronger power—and to seize booty in
the process.9 Acting as privateers with a letter of marque, a captain and crew were
protected from being brought up on charges of piracy if captured. When successful in capturing an enemy merchant vessel, privateers turned over the vessel and
cargo to the privateers’ government in exchange for prize money. Rewards for
privateers often were substantial.10
From a government’s perspective, the major potential advantages of using
privateers were the revenue generated and the damage inflicted on an enemy’s
economy. And the efforts of privateers could be had with little or no cost to a
belligerent’s treasury, because privateers often were completely self-funded. They
might receive a small stipend from their host governments; Queen Elizabeth I of
England, for example, partly funded the privateering efforts of Sir John Hawkins
and Sir Francis Drake—Drake being, perhaps, the most successful privateer in
history.11 Probably because of their low cost to governments combined with their
successes, privateers continued to be used to wage warfare on enemy commerce
until the dawn of the twentieth century.12
Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, maritime trade warfare
in Europe played a role in the almost continuous conflicts among the British,
French, Spanish, Dutch, and others. In the second half of the seventeenth century,
Louis XIV of France, “the Sun King” (1638–1715), engaged his country in three
major wars: the Franco-Dutch War, the War of the League of Augsburg, and the
War of the Spanish Succession. In all three wars, maritime trade warfare played
an important role in damaging enemy economies and preventing the movement of military supplies.13 Because France was primarily a continental power, it
needed to fund and support large land forces. This left it with only a limited ability to build or sustain a substantial navy with which to attack enemy shipping or
fleets directly (i.e., guerre d’escadre, or war of fleets). As an alternative, in the last
decade of the seventeenth century the French began to practice guerre de course
to contest their enemies’ complete command and control of the sea.14
The French enjoyed such great success with maritime trade warfare during
this period that the noted late nineteenth-century naval theorist Rear Admiral
Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, suggested that “at no time has war against commerce
been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period,
. . . [which was] a large factor in bringing the sea nations to wish for peace.”15
Guerre de course or maritime trade warfare has been called a tactic of the
weak because it often has been practiced by nations with weaker navies.16 The
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American colonies employed commerce warfare from the late 1600s onward. For
example, during times of conflict in the period 1739 to 1748, American colonial
privateers sailed on some 466 privateering voyages and captured at least 829 foreign vessels.17 During the War of 1812, American privateers profited handsomely
from attacks on British shipping.18
In the Mediterranean, commerce warfare—perhaps legitimately called piracy
by some—occurred from Roman times into the nineteenth century. The Knights
of Malta preyed on Ottoman shipping sailing between North African and Spanish
ports. During the Crusades, Ottoman pirates profited frequently from attacks on
European shipping. So too the famed “Barbary pirates” attacked ships from countries unwilling to pay a tribute to the local beys (rulers). This included attacks
in the late eighteenth century on merchant ships flagged by the new American
republic, which prompted the U.S. Congress and president to establish a navy.19
Following the Crimean War in the mid-nineteenth century, the great powers
of Europe negotiated the Declaration of Paris in 1856. Signing nations agreed to
end guerre de course. The declaration pledged as follows: “Neutral goods, with
the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy’s
flag.”20 Not surprisingly, other countries did not sign the declaration. One such
was the United States; because its Navy was small, guerre de course offered one of
the few options by which it could attack a more-powerful naval power.21 Indeed,
during the American Civil War, the Confederates employed guerre de course
against Union merchant ships, albeit with only a modest degree of success.22
The twentieth century brought an entirely new approach to maritime trade
warfare with the introduction of several new maritime and naval technologies.
At first, in the very early part of the twentieth century, it appeared to some that
maritime trade warfare actually might cease to be a tactic because of these technological advances and treaties such as the Declaration of Paris.
In fact, in 1911 the noted British naval theorist Sir Julian Corbett declared,
“Modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed
so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that there
is no part of the strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more
liable to error.”23 Corbett believed it would be difficult to provide sufficient coaling stations for modern steam-powered warships to cruise extensively to attack
enemy shipping. He also believed (as though it were a requirement) that it would
be difficult, if not impossible, to embark a prize crew on a captured vessel. As to
merely sinking enemy vessels, Corbett famously stated, “No Power will incur the
odium of sinking a prize with all hands, and their removal to the captor’s ship
takes time.”24 He also theorized that since commercial steam vessels had great
maneuverability, they could avoid potentially dangerous routes on which enemy
warships might be lying in wait.25
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Needless to say, World Wars I and II clearly demonstrated the potential and
effects of maritime trade warfare. At the beginning of World War I, German
reliance on maritime trade for both imports and exports was substantial, and
the British navy believed it had the potential to destroy the German economy
through blockade.26 Ultimately, with the largest and most powerful navy in the
world, Great Britain successfully blockaded Germany and prevented merchant
vessels, German or otherwise, from trading at German ports.
According to Naval War
Whether today’s Navy leadership believes
College professor and naval
that protecting shipping in a maritime trade
theorist Dr. Milan Vego, “a
warfare situation is a Navy mission is a moot blo ckaded countr y often
point. . . . [T]he U.S. Navy has no doctrine
resorts to commercial counand no current practices regarding protecting terblockade.”27 As an imperial
maritime commerce from attack, and precious power with the most far-flung
few resources with which to do so in any case. empire in history, Britain was
dependent on the sea for trade
with its colonies and with nations providing matériel for the war effort. Not
surprisingly, as the war progressed Germany increasingly countered the British
blockade with commerce warfare, using the submarine.28
By the end of World War I, the Germans had managed to sink 11,153,000 tons
of Allied merchant shipping, comprising 2,990 commercial ships and 578 fishing
vessels. To accomplish this, the Germans used some 390 submarines, of which
Allied forces sank 178.29
Although Germany was not as dependent on seaborne commerce at the
beginning of World War II as it had been in 1914, its maritime trade was still
important. As in World War I, the British early in World War II established a
blockade of German ports. The Germans responded with commerce warfare in
the form of air and submarine attacks on British, and later Allied, maritime trade
and on British port infrastructure. In total, during this war the Germans sank
5,150 Allied merchant ships displacing 21.57 million tons.30 The German attacks
on maritime trade not only destroyed ships; they greatly disrupted the entire
military supply chain by requiring the use of large, slow convoys and by causing
substantial rerouting of ships, which increased voyage times. They also caused
negative second-order effects by slowing the production of military equipment
and supplies.31
The cost to the Germans of their submarine warfare campaign was the loss of
785 submarines and their crews.32 However, looking at the big picture, the Allied
cost in dollars and additional resources for protecting vessels with convoys and
other measures and for merchant vessels lost nonetheless was substantially higher
than the cost to the Germans of building and operating their submarine fleet.33 In
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other words, although the Germans were not ultimately successful in curtailing
Allied maritime trade, they might have been if circumstances had been somewhat
different. In any case, the U-boats greatly disrupted the entire Allied war effort
and caused the Allies to expend substantial resources to protect their sea-lanes.34
German maritime trade warfare was at least partly successful.
In World War II, the United States prosecuted a very successful maritime
trade warfare campaign against Japan, destroying 8.1 million tons of merchant
shipping. The United States employed 288 submarines in the Pacific, which were
responsible for sinking about 4.9 million tons of that total; aircraft, surface ships,
and mines accomplished the remainder. This crippled the Japanese merchant marine, which prevented the importation of critical supplies, starving the Japanese
military, economy, and people.35 The Japanese did not employ any significant
maritime trade warfare against the United States during World War II, because it
simply was not a part of Japanese naval doctrine, nor did it seem to conform to
the Japanese Bushido (warrior) code. Further, the Japanese offered no effective
defenses against the U.S. maritime trade warfare campaign.36
Maritime Trade Warfare in the Latter Half of the Twentieth Century
As noted earlier, the 1856 Declaration of Paris banned attacks on commercial
shipping by privateers—at least, those of the European nations that signed the
treaty. This was followed by significant maritime technological advances in the
construction of naval vessels, including submarines, and the torpedo, which
caused at least some naval theorists—such as the respected Sir Julian Corbett
quoted earlier—to believe that commerce warfare in the modern age was farfetched and very unlikely. Obviously, the events of World Wars I and II proved
otherwise.37
In the dozens of conflicts that have broken out around the globe since World
War II, maritime trade warfare has been relatively rare. During the U.S. interventions in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, it was and has been limited or
nonexistent. As a result of the lack of maritime trade warfare in recent times, and
in a manner similar to the propositions of naval theorists a century ago, there
are those who believe that commerce warfare has been relegated to the history
books. As Professor Douglas Peifer of the University of North Carolina notes in
an article, “‘Maritime commerce warfare’ has a distinctly dated whiff.”38 Still, as in
the days of Corbett, this contention can be called into question.
Indeed, maritime trade warfare did occur in the second half of the twentieth
century, albeit infrequently. During the period of the Yom Kippur or Ramadan
War of 1973, for example, the Egyptians attempted to blockade commercial shipping traffic to prevent oil tankers from reaching Israel from Iran. To accomplish
this, the Egyptians mined Israeli ports and declared a naval blockade in the Red
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Sea. Had the war lasted longer, the Egyptians’ maritime trade warfare might have
been successful, because Israel had no other method of obtaining the necessary
oil supplies.39
The Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) provides another very clear example of maritime
trade warfare in relatively recent times. The so-called tanker war began in early
1981, when the Iraqis announced that all shipping headed to and from Iran was
subject to attack. In 1982, Iraq attacked the Iranian oil terminal and commercial
shipping at Khārk (Kharg) Island.40 In every respect, this was maritime trade
warfare.
Initially, Iran had little ability to attack commercial shipping bound for Iraq,
but this eventually changed; by 1987, Iran was targeting tankers bound for Iraq
effectively. In 1986, to protect its shipping interests, Kuwait requested assistance
from the international community, including the United States. In 1987, several
Kuwaiti tankers were reflagged to the United States, in theory protecting them
from Iraqi or Iranian attack, since the United States was a neutral nation.41 In any
case, it was conjectured that the U.S. Navy would protect these ships through a
convoy system, which is what eventually occurred.
In total, the marine insurance company Lloyd’s of London reported that 546
commercial ships were damaged during the Iran-Iraq War, killing 430 merchant
mariners.42 Of the ships attacked, very few actually were sunk. Sixty-one percent
of the vessels attacked (239 ships) were tankers. Fifty-five of these tankers were
declared “constructive total losses.” Thirty-nine percent of the bulk carriers attacked and 32 percent of the freighters attacked also were declared constructive
total losses.43
The Use of Mines in Maritime Trade Warfare
Although the American David Bushnell is credited with developing the first naval mine in 1776 and mines were used to a limited extent in nineteenth-century
wars, it was during World War I that the mine became a major weapon against
navies and merchant ships.44 Mines historically have been used to restrict access
to a sea area and to blockade commercial vessels from port areas—a form of
maritime trade warfare. Certainly World Wars I and II offer many examples of
this type of warfare. In World War II alone some seven hundred thousand mines
were sown. These accounted for the loss of 650 Allied ships and 1,100 Axis ships,
with another eight hundred damaged between them. In fact, mines damaged or
sank more vessels than any other weapon.45 Perhaps the best example of the use
of mines in maritime trade warfare was Operation STARVATION in the summer
of 1945, for which the U.S. Navy and Army Air Corps sowed eleven thousand
mines off the coasts and ports of Japan, sinking 605 Japanese merchant ships and
sixty-five warships.46
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From May 1972 through January 1973, the United States mined Haiphong
Harbor in North Vietnam and two other, smaller North Vietnamese ports. This
effectively closed these ports to commercial shipping, forcing North Vietnam
to use inland roads and railroads from Chinese ports for imports and exports.47
During the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, Iran made extensive use of mines in an
effort to blockade Kuwaiti ports. The mines damaged numerous merchant ships
from many countries, although these efforts did not curtail merchant shipping
in the Persian Gulf.48
ARGUMENTS FOR THE USE OF MARITIME TRADE WARFARE IN
THE FUTURE
Some theorists believe that maritime trade warfare will continue to be used in any
lengthy war conducted at least partly at sea.49 Supporters of maritime trade warfare acknowledge that, for it to be an effective instrument for crippling an enemy’s
economy in general and preventing military supplies in particular from getting
through, the time factor is essential. In other words, it takes time for maritime
trade warfare to have the desired economic and military effects.
Geography also plays an important role in maritime trade warfare. An island
nation, a coastal nation isolated by geographical features that are a barrier to
land trade, or a nation with hostile neighbors is more vulnerable to maritime
trade warfare.50 Regarding the notion that because of the integration of the global
economy commerce warfare is unlikely in future conflicts, proponents note that
before 1914 many Europeans believed that a large-scale European war never
would happen because it would lead to a European economic collapse that would
harm all participating nations. Proponents argue that in many ways the global
economy was intertwined prior to World War I in ways similar to today, yet both
sides used maritime trade warfare as a tactic during the war.51
Prospects for Blockading
Given the past successes of maritime trade warfare, some experts contend that
commerce warfare not only is likely to be practiced but should be incorporated into many conflict scenarios as an essential component of military strategy
and tactics. In a Yale Law Journal article written in the 1990s, author Michael
Fraunces notes:
In the future, blockade may become even more important as the need of a blockading state to stop every merchant ship grows vital. The recent willingness of ostensibly
neutral states to supply not simply technical know-how and materials for weapons of
mass destruction, but also ready-for-use missiles and other decisive weapons, to the
highest bidder portends such a future. As the negative consequences of allowing even
one ship to pass uninspected grow more severe, blockading states will become more
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willing to use the new blockade forms (long-range blockade and blockade zones) at
the expense of neutral interests.52

To be sure, discussion in military circles today regarding maritime trade warfare is very limited, if it occurs at all. There currently is no U.S. military doctrine
that even raises the issues of offensive or defensive maritime trade warfare. This
situation is reminiscent of the interwar years: despite the extensive use of maritime trade warfare during World War I, requiring the United States to protect its
convoys, during the 1920s and ’30s the Navy essentially forgot the lessons it had
learned. When the United States entered World War II, German submarines had
a field day sinking American shipping, often in plain sight of the American mainland, because merchant shipping was given no protection at all.53 The then Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, believed the Navy
had no obligation to protect
commercial shipping, in light
[O]pponents of modern commerce warfare
contend that it simply is not possible to isolate of the many other demands
the service faced at the time.54
a powerful nation through maritime trade
warfare without devastating the entire global Whether today’s Navy leadership believes that protecting
economy.
shipping in a maritime trade
warfare situation is a Navy mission is a moot point. Aside from fighting piracy in
East Africa, which could be regarded as protecting shipping, the U.S. Navy has no
doctrine and no current practices regarding protecting maritime commerce from
attack, and precious few resources with which to do so in any case.
Some military experts contend that maritime trade warfare not only is likely in
future conflicts, but that it can and should be a strategy the United States directs
its military to employ. The services therefore should plan for and practice this
employment, in the form of military exercises conducted from both offensive
and defensive perspectives. Given the growing power, including naval power,
of several nations around the world, some military experts have weighed the
potential for maritime trade warfare being employed in a conflict and believe it
is a worthy strategy.
The possibility of conducting maritime trade warfare against China is one example. In a paper entitled “Offshore Control: A Proposed Strategy for an Unlikely
Conflict,” retired U.S. Marine Corps colonel T. X. Hammes contends that in a
protracted conflict with China the United States could employ a strategy of “offshore control” to interdict China’s energy, raw material, and industrial imports
and exports to strangle the country’s economy. According to Hammes, this could
be achieved through the use of Navy ships, Army and Navy boarding teams, and
contracted shipping and helicopters.55
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Essentially, Colonel Hammes believes that blockading shipments to China
through the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda and controlling the north–
south routes to and from Australia could block 80 percent of China’s oil imports.
Further, blockading exports from China would rob China of its source of economic power. This would force the Chinese to the bargaining table, which very
likely would end the conflict.56
Colonel Hammes states:
Clearly the U.S. Navy has insufficient ships to control the almost 1,500 very large
commercial ships projected to be in use by 2015. However, these numbers can be
controlled by U.S. amphibious shipping projecting Army and Marine boarding parties that will travel with the ships to ensure they do not enter the maritime exclusion zone. Commercial shipping and helicopters could be contracted to support the
distant efforts, thus reducing the stress on the amphibious fleet.57

In their article “No Oil for the Lamps of China,” authors Gabriel Collins and
William Murray further explain how the U.S. Navy could block the key straits on
Chinese trade routes effectively:
It appears then that at least ten surface warships and two replenishment vessels would
be required to establish an effective and protected distant blockade at the Straits of
Malacca. This number would increase proportionally if the Lombok Strait, Sunda
Strait, and the route around Australia also had to be patrolled. The authors estimate
that three surface warships and accompanying replenishment vessels per additional
strait would be necessary to provide reasonable assurance that all passing tankers
could be boarded, inspected, and if necessary escorted to a quarantine anchorage.
This gives a minimum total of sixteen surface warships and four replenishment
vessels.58

In a well-researched article in the Journal of Strategic Studies, author Sean
Mirski argues as follows: “A blockade strategy [against China] is viable, but it
would be limited to a narrow context: the United States would have to be engaged in a protracted conflict over vital interests, and it would need the support
of key regional powers. The United States would also need to implement a mix
between a close and distant blockade in order to avoid imperiling the conflict’s
strategic context. If enacted, a blockade could exact a ruinous cost on the Chinese
economy and state.”59 Mirski comments that the existing literature on commerce
warfare is “remarkably sparse, circumscribed, and inconclusive,” in large part because commercial links between China and the United States are so intertwined
that maritime trade warfare is considered unlikely because it would be too mutually destructive.60
Yet Naval War College professor Dr. Milan Vego believes that maritime trade
warfare remains a possibility in the future. He notes that another large-scale

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/3

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 24

10

4/21/17 8:35 AM

McMahon: Maritime Trade Warfare

MCMAHON

25

global war may never occur; however, history suggests that the improbable often
becomes reality. He uses World War I as an example; as noted earlier, theorists in
the early twentieth century did not believe a large European war would occur—
yet it did. Similarly, some naval theorists in the early part of the twentieth century
suggested that the days of commerce warfare were over—yet in both world wars,
maritime trade warfare was definitely a reality.61 Accordingly, Vego believes that
in a large, long-term conflict, maritime trade warfare is probable. He also believes
that attacks on maritime trade might take the form of attacks on infrastructure
and ports and, perhaps, some forms of cyber warfare, but that “attacks on ships
at sea and in port would also be essential.”62
Prospects for Use of Mines
Historically, mines have been used effectively to blockade merchant shipping
from entering a belligerent’s ports. In numerous conflicts, mines have proved
themselves to be quite deadly. It is noteworthy that since World War II, fourteen
USN ships have been sunk or damaged by mines, compared with only two that
have been damaged by missile or air attack.63 Mines are relatively inexpensive,
and nations throughout the world keep tens of thousands in their inventories.64
Available current literature on the use of mines to blockade as a form of commerce warfare is quite sparse. However, given the low cost and deadly effectiveness of mines in past conflicts, it seems reasonable to some experts that mines
could play an important role in modern maritime trade warfare by effectively
blockading the ports and harbors of an enemy.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE LIKELIHOOD OF MARITIME TRADE
WARFARE IN THE FUTURE
While acknowledging the historical successes of maritime trade warfare, there
are those who contend that this type of warfare is essentially a strategy and tactic
of the past. Numerous factors support this position.
The Nature of the Global Economy
In a manner similar to the arguments offered prior to World War I, the integrated
nature of the global economy today and the difficulty of interdicting maritime
commerce often are cited as reasons there will be no maritime trade warfare in
the future. In 1897, Germany’s Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz—given the
situation at the time—projected as follows: “Commerce raiding and transatlantic
war against England is so hopeless, because of the shortage of bases on our side
and the superfluity on England’s side, that we must ignore this type of war against
England in our plans for the constitution of our fleet.”65 Obviously, Admiral
Tirpitz’s prediction of how developments would unfold was significantly off the
mark.
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Regarding the integrated global economy of today, opponents of modern commerce warfare contend that it simply is not possible to isolate a powerful nation
through maritime trade warfare without devastating the entire global economy.
Yes, the global economy was integrated to some extent prior to World War I, but
not to the degree and scope that it is today. The technological developments in
communications and transportation and more-positive international government policy environments established around the world in the last half-century
have expanded trade greatly in both size and scope.66 At the beginning of the
nineteenth century, global trade was estimated to be U.S.$1.5 billion; by 1850
this had risen to $4 billion; and by 1900 to $24 billion.67 In 2014, global trade was
reported to be $18.5 trillion.68 Worldwide, in manufacturing exports alone there
was a 3,500 percent increase just from 1950 to 1998.69
World Wars I and II devastated the global economy. The reasoning follows
that, with the economic destruction they inflicted so obvious, and with the global
economy even more integrated today than it was prior to those wars, another
conflict involving maritime trade warfare is as unthinkable as it is unlikely.
The Nature of Global Merchant Shipping
The complexity of the global commercial maritime business also is put forward
as a reason maritime trade warfare is unlikely in the future. Until the late 1940s,
commercial ships typically were financed, owned, built, and crewed in the flag
state of their registry. This changed dramatically in the decades after World War
II, with the proliferation of “flag-of-convenience registries.”70 Today, more than
half the world’s merchant ships are registered in flag-of-convenience countries.71
In many cases, the actual ownership of a vessel is difficult to ascertain.
Complicating this is the very nature of modern commercial shipping. Ownership of bulk cargoes such as oil, grain, and iron ore, as well as the destinations of
those cargoes, can change, sometimes repeatedly, as cargoes are sold and resold
throughout the course of a voyage. With general cargo and container vessels,
ownership and cargo destinations also can be complex. A single ship can contain
multiple cargoes—sometimes thousands—destined for dozens of countries, often
located far beyond the port of discharge.72 The basic problem is that boarding,
search, and seizure of vessels and cargoes on the high seas is complicated because
it can be difficult to identify the ownership of a ship and cargo and because a vessel’s cargoes often are destined for many countries. When a nation seizes or sinks
a vessel apparently bound for a belligerent nation, its cargo, or at least a portion
thereof, may be the property of a neutral nation, or even an ally.
Another factor of the modern global merchant marine is simply its size.
In 1939, prior to World War II, the combined size of the entire global merchant marine was about fifty-seven million deadweight tons.73 This included
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approximately twelve thousand vessels in deep-sea trade. Today, the size of the
global merchant marine is about 1.75 billion deadweight tons, with about ninety
thousand commercial vessels.74 In other words, there are tens of thousands more
vessels in the world today than in the decades prior to World War II, and they are
larger as well. At the same time, the number of naval vessels available in the larger
navies of the world today—those warships capable of conducting maritime trade
warfare or interdiction in any form—is very small.
These factors clearly indicate that conducting maritime trade warfare effectively would be exceedingly difficult in most scenarios today. Identifying vessels
and cargoes belonging to a belligerent is much more complex today than it was in
those historical situations in which maritime trade warfare proved a productive
strategy and tactic. In any case, the number of naval vessels or auxiliaries needed
to implement successfully an effective maritime trade warfare campaign would
be very substantial—far more, in most scenarios, than the number of vessels
needed during World War II. Compounding this is the fact that even the large
navies of the world today are much smaller than in the era of the world wars.
Use of Alternative Intermodal Transportation
There are other reasons to argue that maritime trade warfare in the twenty-first
century would require massive resources yet would be ineffective. As maritime
transportation technologies have made great strides with the development of
containerization and container shipping, so too have land port infrastructure
and intermodal transportation. The majority of the world is linked as never before, not just by ports but by highly efficient ports, ports that are linked to vast
networks of roads, railroads, and airports. This means that, in many cases, trade
by sea can be bypassed by using other modes of transportation. Doing so might
raise transportation costs significantly, but it nonetheless could render maritime
trade warfare ineffective.
It must be noted, for example, that even during World War II German maritime trade warfare in the Atlantic was not effective in blocking the majority of
economic and military supplies from reaching the Soviet Union from North
America. In fact, of the supplies sent that reached the Soviet Union, 23 percent
did so through Iran and another 46 percent reached Pacific coast ports of the Soviet Union—passing near Japan, which had a nonaggression pact with the Soviet
Union until 1945. Today, in an era of much more sophisticated railroad, pipeline,
and aviation intermodal links, maritime trade warfare alone, in many cases,
would not isolate a country—particularly one with friendly or neutral countries
on its borders. In a conflict with China, for example, it would be highly unlikely
that land intermodal shipments of oil and other cargoes to and from one or more
of China’s many neighbors could be blocked.75
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In November 2014, for example, China initiated a new train service from
China west to Spain, a route covering a distance of some 6,200 miles and requiring approximately twenty-one days’ travel.76 In January 2017, the first freight
train from China arrived in London after a 7,500-mile journey, having reached
its destination in eighteen days—half the time required for a sea voyage.77 In addition, China has the ability to link to Russia’s Trans-Siberian Railway and other
rail lines across Asia. Further, according to Global Risk Insights, during the past
few years Russia and China have forged new energy deals that will open energy
pipeline links from Russia to China.78 The Chinese also are funding both rail
and pipeline links from China to Myanmar ports so as to bypass the Straits of
Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda.79
In other words, although the Chinese do rely on ocean transportation for the
majority of their energy, raw materials, and exports, they have several neighbors
and connections to numerous intermodal links to the Middle East and Europe
that could ease their dependence on marine transportation during a military
conflict. Most coastal nations, especially large nations, have the same ability.
Use of Reserves and Rationing
For any military conflict or other national emergency in which vital imports
such as energy supplies are required, many nations around the world have plans
and infrastructure in place to conduct rationing. In addition, many countries,
including the United States, have established substantial petroleum reserves,
which would provide energy supplies for an extended period during a national
emergency.80
If targeted states brought in resources via intermodal links other than the sea,
then rationed them carefully, the results desired from maritime trade warfare
might be minimal.
The Naval Resources Question
The question of the naval resources needed to conduct maritime trade warfare in
the form of imposing an effective blockade is a very significant one. With regard
to a country such as China—or any other country in East Asia, for that matter—
the supporters of maritime trade warfare cited in this article focus on blockades
of the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda as the method for restricting energy supply lines or otherwise curtailing economic activity, particularly exports.
These studies indicate that a relatively small number of naval ships could blockade the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda successfully, effectively isolating
the energy and economic supply lines to and from China.81
However, the imposition of a blockade in these straits would be illegal under
international law, as represented by the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea. The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations notes:
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Belligerent forces transiting through international straits overlapped by neutral
waters must proceed without delay, must refrain from the threat or use of force
against the neutral nation, and must otherwise refrain from acts of hostility and other
activities not incident to their transit. . . . Belligerent forces may not use neutral straits
as a place of sanctuary or as a base of operations and belligerent warships may not
exercise the belligerent right of visit and search in those waters.82

It could, perhaps, be argued that blockading naval vessels could operate in
waters sufficiently far away from international straits to remain compliant with
international law. However, this would increase significantly the number of naval
resources required to implement an effective blockade. In any case, 2014 data
indicate that in that year alone there were some 79,000 transits through the Strait
of Malacca. These involved 25,071 containerships and 4,993 very large crude oil
carriers (VLCCs), in addition to tens of thousands of smaller cargo vessels and
tankers. This translates to about 217 ships a day passing through the Strait of
Malacca.83 Adding the vessels transiting the Sunda and Lombok Straits would increase significantly the daily and annual ship-transit totals. Simply put, the naval
resources needed to effect a legal blockade in areas near these straits—to board,
search, and inspect vessels and to provide escorts to quarantine anchorages for
suspect vessels—would be far more significant than is accounted for in any of the
sources cited in this article.
It further complicates this problem that there is a huge swath of the Pacific
Ocean that could be used for alternative routes to China and the rest of East
Asia—numerous Pacific Ocean trade routes to Asia are available that do not use
any strait. True, this would add to shipping and other transportation costs, owing
to the longer distances covered (west from the Panama Canal and northwest from
Cape Horn), but nevertheless these routes could be used.
For a VLCC traveling from Saudi Arabian oil terminals to Shanghai, China,
today, for example, the transportation cost of crude oil is thirteen to eighteen
cents per gallon for a transit of about eighteen days.84 Crude oil transportation
to China from Venezuela instead, via the Panama Canal in a tanker somewhat
smaller than a VLCC, would require twenty-six days. VLCC oil transportation
from Angola to China via Cape Horn would entail a voyage of about forty days.85
Clearly, the added distance in longer voyages would add to transportation
costs—possibly doubling them, or more—but this hardly would impose an insurmountable expense if the Straits of Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda were being
blockaded. The Suez Canal has been closed five times since its opening in 1869,
including for the eight years between 1967 and 1975.86 Oil tankers and cargo vessels transiting from the Middle East to Europe and the Americas were required
to transit much longer distances around the Cape of Good Hope, and at greater
expense to shippers, but this did not impose an overbearing economic hardship
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on the countries of Europe or the Americas. Similarly, if the Straits of Malacca,
Lombok, and Sunda were blockaded, using Pacific Ocean shipping routes to East
Asia would create a hardship, but one that could be endured.
Any attempt to conduct maritime trade warfare (or interdiction) against all
the Pacific Ocean route approaches to Asia and the approaches to the Straits of
Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda would require a huge number of naval vessels, with
all the complicated logistics and resupply associated therewith. Further, for every
naval and resupply vessel used for maritime trade warfare and blockade, one
fewer vessel would be available for other naval missions—missions that probably
would be critically important in a time of military conflict.
The Targeting Problem
As noted earlier, there are some ninety thousand deep-sea commercial vessels
in the world. This does not include hundreds of thousands of fishing vessels,
coastwise vessels, and other special-purpose vessels. The waters in and around
East Asia teem with traffic—thousands of vessels within a relatively small area.
Identifying which vessels to board, search, and seize would be a daunting task
that would get harder the closer one approached the Asian mainland or a choke
point such as a strait.
It is true that commercial vessels now broadcast on an Automatic Identification System (AIS) frequency, by which they identify themselves, but AIS can be
switched off. During the recent piracy crisis off the coast of Somalia, for example,
many vessels simply turned off their AIS to avoid identification. In a maritime
trade warfare situation, many vessels, including neutral vessels, likely would not
broadcast their AIS signals, further complicating identification efforts.87
The Complexity Involved in Sinking Vessels
Some supporters of maritime trade warfare suggest the establishment of a maritime exclusion zone, with any commercial vessel entering the MEZ subject to
attack and sinking. The theory is that this would prevent merchant ships from
entering the zone.
However, the collateral consequences of sinking a modern commercial vessel would be huge. Sinking a vessel likely would result in the deaths of innocent
merchant mariners, probably from a large number of nations, including friendly
or neutral ones. Some might view this as a war crime.
In addition, the environmental impact of sinking a large ship, especially a petroleum tanker, would be immense. Sinking a VLCC, which can carry more than
165 million gallons of crude oil, would create an environmental disaster of epic
proportions. The destruction of fishing grounds and the pollution of thousands
of square miles of coastlines would be enormous.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/3

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 30

16

4/21/17 8:35 AM

McMahon: Maritime Trade Warfare

MCMAHON

31

While the German and American navies had great success in sinking merchant vessels during World War II, the problem today is much more complex.
Simply put, merchant ships now are huge—much larger than those that sailed the
seas during the twentieth-century world wars. It likely would take a significant
amount of ordnance to sink a ship, or even to damage and disable it. Recall that
very few of the 546 ships attacked during the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s were
declared constructive total losses, and almost none actually were sunk. No recent
studies are available that analyze the methods and weapon capabilities needed to
sink modern commercial vessels; the problem is likely much more complex than
many realize.
Adding to this problem is the scarce inventory of available weapons and ordnance. Just as the number of naval vessels available for maritime trade warfare is
extremely small, so too is the availability of ordnance needed to accomplish the
task. While production of naval ships, weapons, and ordnance in theory could
be ramped up, this would take a substantial amount of time. In fact, it would
take much more time than was needed after America entered World War II in
December of 1941. At that time shipbuilding and weapons-manufacturing companies already had increased their production substantially over a span of years,
yet it took years more for the United States to produce enough ships, weapons,
and ordnance to protect against German maritime trade warfare effectively and
to establish an offensive maritime trade warfare campaign against Japan.
Maritime Trade Warfare Does Not Curtail Shipping
Some believe that even the threat of maritime trade warfare would cause shipowners from nonbelligerent countries to keep their vessels out of hostile waters.
In individual instances this might be true, but history shows that generally it is
not so. During the age of sail, shipowners were quite willing to sail into harm’s
way because profit motives outweighed concern for the safety of their vessels.
The world wars of the twentieth century also offer no exception. During the
relatively recent tanker wars during the Iran-Iraq War, there was an initial 25
percent decrease in shipping traffic, but this soon changed as profits for shipowners soared. More ships became available to carry crude oil, despite the dangers
involved. To cover the cost of higher marine insurance premiums, Iran reduced
the price of its oil exports.88
The Question of Mines
Historically, mines have been used effectively in commerce warfare as a form
of blockade to close the ports and harbors of a belligerent. Given the massive
number of mines in the current inventories of some nations, it seems reasonable that mines might be used with great effectiveness, and in some cases this is
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probably true. For a relatively small island nation with a limited number of ports,
an enemy with substantial mining capabilities probably could blockade its ports
very effectively.
However, the scenarios under which this might occur are quite limited. With
regard to large countries having multiple ports and effective militaries, the challenges to effective mining are many. In a country such as the United States or
China, for example, it would be exceedingly difficult for an enemy’s submarines,
other vessels, or aircraft to sow mines in ports, harbors, or approach channels.
During the India-Pakistan War of 1971, for example, Pakistan attempted to sow
mines in Indian waters with a submarine, but was unsuccessful owing to Indian
navy intervention.89
A large country such as the
[I]f plans are not put in place and exercised to United States, India, or China
protect strategic sealift vessels, . . . protection
or an economic zone such
of warships is really a moot point. Without
as the European Union has
a reliable and capable supply chain of comdozens of ports. The resources
mercial and military logistics ships, warships
needed to blockade all these
cannot operate and fight far from American
ports effectively using mines
shores for any significant span of time.
would be quite substantial,
and such efforts similarly
would be vulnerable to intervention by local navies. Further, merchant ships
blockaded from one port could shift to ports in neighboring countries and load
and discharge their cargoes at intermodal facilities there, thereby limiting the
mine blockade’s effectiveness. As noted previously, the United States did manage
to close North Vietnamese ports with mines during the latter half of the Vietnam
War; however, North Vietnam at the time had only one large port and two smaller
ones, and no navy to challenge the U.S. Navy. Despite the resultant reduction in
transportation capabilities, North Vietnam was able to divert shipping to Chinese
ports and use road and rail into North Vietnam, although this was less efficient.
Finally, the mine ordnance necessary to effect a commercial blockade is significant and grows substantially as the number of ports, harbors, channels, and
coastal areas that require mining increases. And the United States, for example,
has only a very small inventory of mines.
A review of the sources cited in this article reveals general agreement that determining the likelihood of maritime trade warfare being practiced in the future is
a complex question. The proponents and opponents of maritime trade warfare
agree that, to be effective, maritime trade warfare generally needs to be executed
over a significant span of time. The American and German campaigns of World
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War II eventually had great effect, but required several years to reach that point.
The Egyptian campaign against Israel in 1967 was not effective because of its
short duration.
Proponents and opponents of maritime trade warfare also agree that any use
of this strategy and tactic would have devastating impacts on today’s global economy. An unanswered question is whether maritime trade warfare really would
bring a belligerent nation to the bargaining table, or simply escalate the conflict,
which might spiral out of control. The answer seems to be that it would depend
entirely on the situation; either result might occur. This certainly makes reliance
on maritime trade warfare a dangerous business.
Another concern is that in regional or limited wars with powerful nations
involved, commerce warfare is likely to create second-order effects that might
draw other nations into the conflict. In the colonial-era Seven Years’ War, for
example, British commerce raiding expanded beyond attacks on French vessels to
include attacks on neutral Dutch vessels, which strained relations with a friendly
country.90 In the 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War, Russia, fearing consequences
after numerous protests from the British and American governments, restricted
its maritime trade warfare.91 In the early part of World War II, Hitler specifically
forbade German submarines from attacking American vessels lest such attacks
bring the United States into the war on Britain’s side.92 Would similar problems
arise with modern use of maritime trade warfare? Would allied nations support
maritime trade warfare, or would they attempt to circumvent blockades? Again,
either outcome might occur.
Maritime trade warfare, however likely or unlikely it is to occur, could have
vast global, regional, and national consequences. Therefore policy makers and
military planners should consider the topic thoroughly from an offensive and—
equally important—a defensive standpoint. When the United States entered
World War II, the Navy was ill prepared for German maritime trade warfare and
largely remained so until 1943. The resulting commercial and military sealift
shipping losses were enormous, and thousands of merchant mariners lost their
lives.93 The United States today is equally unprepared to defend itself against
maritime trade warfare or to protect American commerce and strategic sealift
on the high seas.
To support its allies and national interests, the United States has taken on
worldwide missions, and therefore has the most expeditionary military in the
world. With the requirement to operate, in many cases, far forward from the
continental United States, the armed forces rely heavily on ocean transportation
for the majority of their lift capacity, in terms of tonnage. To support its worldwide ocean-transportation needs, the U.S. military depends on internal sealift
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capabilities through the Navy’s Military Sealift Command; for rapid deployment,
on the Maritime Administration’s Ready Reserve Fleet of government-owned
vessels; and for sustainment, on the U.S. Merchant Marine (commercial vessels).
This triad of fleets offers substantial sealift capacity.
However, the potential for losses in this maritime capability through the offensive actions of enemy maritime trade warfare against the United States simply
is not factored adequately into the nation’s policies or plans. During a July 2014
congressional hearing on sealift force requirements, the deputy commander
of U.S. Transportation Command was asked about the potential for attacks on
strategic sealift vessels. In his response he admitted, “So in terms of protecting
ships as they go across [the ocean], we . . . don’t have a lot of attrition built into
our modeling. . . . [T]hat is not something that we really build in there.”94 In other
words, although the United States currently has a substantial military sealift capability, the losses resulting from even moderately successful attacks on U.S.-flag
shipping could have far-reaching consequences.
Further, the number of U.S.-flag merchant vessels engaged in international
trade and available for strategic sealift is very small—seventy-eight—compared
with the tens of thousands of merchant ships under other flags.95 Should losses
occur in the U.S. Merchant Marine as a result of an enemy maritime warfare
campaign, it is certainly questionable whether America could rely on foreign-flag
commercial vessels for economic or military sealift.96 Yet this topic receives little
attention.
Perhaps logically, USN planning efforts center on the protection of surface
combatants, particularly aircraft carriers. However, if plans are not put in place
and exercised to protect strategic sealift vessels, to include both governmentowned vessels and those of the U.S. Merchant Marine, protection of warships is
really a moot point. Without a reliable and capable supply chain of commercial
and military logistics ships, warships cannot operate and fight far from American
shores for any significant span of time.
The conduct of maritime trade warfare in the twenty-first century represents
a complex problem that in many conflict scenarios would not yield positive
results. However, history is full of examples of maritime trade warfare proving
an effective strategy against enemies—which sometimes was the United States.
Likewise, history is full of examples of “experts” and political leaders insisting
that maritime trade warfare would not work—only to be proved very wrong as
new conflicts and scenarios presented themselves.
Accordingly, it seems quite appropriate in the twenty-first century that historical lessons learned from maritime trade warfare campaigns of the past be
studied carefully, and that political leaders and military planners consider, plan,
and exercise scenarios involving maritime trade warfare from both offensive and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss3/3

NWC_Summer2017Review.indb 34

20

4/21/17 8:35 AM

McMahon: Maritime Trade Warfare

MCMAHON

35

defensive perspectives. Doing anything less risks repeating some of the greatest
mistakes of maritime history.
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